Fault Injection Attacks

This course was developed as a MEST Micro-Certificate. MEST Micro-Certificates offer short, self-paced learning opportunities through focused training modules and webinars on specialized technical topics. Participants who successfully complete the program requirements earn a certificate of completion.

These programs are designed for U.S. citizens, including Department of War and other government personnel, government-affiliated employees, industry professionals, college students, and faculty.


Fault injection attacks are one of the most powerful hardware attack techniques, capable of corrupting computations, bypassing security checks, and extracting secret keys from cryptographic hardware. By deliberately inducing transient or permanent faults through clock/voltage glitching, electromagnetic pulses, or invasive methods, adversaries can exploit vulnerabilities in SoCs and IP cores. Understanding these attacks is essential for engineers and researchers developing secure systems, as they highlight the limits of traditional verification and the need for robust countermeasures. This certificate provides hands-on exposure to fault injection techniques, detection methods, security property development, and emulation-based vulnerability assessment, enabling learners to analyze and defend real-world hardware against such threats.

Students will learn how fault injection attacks compromise hardware security, how to simulate and detect such attacks, and how to apply emulation-based techniques for early-stage vulnerability assessment. They will gain practical experience with fault injection on AES, TDC sensor–based detection, assertion-driven verification, and high-performance hardware emulation platforms.

This micro-certificate course is organized into a set of units described below:

  • Unit 1: Fault Injection Attack on AES Cipher
    Introduces clock and voltage glitch attacks using ChipWhisperer CW305 FPGA targets. Students will perform hands-on glitching experiments on AES to observe how faults alter cryptographic outputs and compromise key security.

  • Unit 2: Detection of Fault Injection Attacks Using TDC Sensor
    Covers the theory and practice of using Time-Digital Converter (TDC) sensors for detecting anomalous timing variations caused by fault injections. Students will implement TDC sensors on a Zynq SoC FPGA to detect real-time voltage glitch–based attacks.

  • Unit 3: Security Property Development and Fault Injection Simulation
    Focuses on modeling non-invasive, semi-invasive, and invasive fault attacks at the gate level. Learners will develop SystemVerilog security properties and use simulation-based tools (e.g., ZOIX) to inject and analyze faults in AES designs.

  • Unit 4: Hardware Emulation–based Fault Injection Vulnerability Assessment
    Provides training in assertion-based fault injection assessment using Synopsys ZeBu® emulation. Students will inject runtime hardware faults, monitor violations using SystemVerilog Assertions, and evaluate countermeasures for cryptographic IPs

Format: Online, asynchronous
Platform: nanoHUB Learning Management System
Level: Advanced Undergraduate/Graduate Student
Prerequisites: A background in RTL design and C++ programming will be helpful.
Instructor:

  • Professor Farimah Farahmandi, University of Florida

  • Professor Mark M. Tehranipoor, University of Florida


Course Objectives:

  1. Perform clock and voltage glitch attacks on AES using ChipWhisperer

  2. Implement TDC sensor-based detection on a Zynq SoC FPGA

  3. Develop security properties in SystemVerilog for fault injection scenarios

  4. Simulate non-invasive, semi-invasive, and invasive fault attacks at the gate level

  5. Conduct assertion-based fault injection assessment using Synopsys ZeBu emulation

 

Request Course Enrollment

To enroll in this course, you must have a nanoHUB account. Create one here: https://nanohub.org/register/
Request membership in the MEST group in nanoHUB at https://nanohub.org/groups/mest

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System-on-Chip (SoC) Design

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Counterfeit Detection: Circuit Based